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LIKE the investment agencies and the compilers of the legal lists,
the securities markets are engaged in the process of rating cor-
porate bond investments. During most of the period covered by
our records corporate bonds enjoyed an active market, so that it
was possible to obtain tolerably reliable market prices and yields,
and to infer from them the way in which the market rated the
bonds. The particular rating used for the purpose is a "yield
spread" or "risk premium," defined as the difference between the
promised yield of a given issue and the promised yield of out-
standing issues of the highest grade that had the same term to
maturity.
Following the outline of preceding chapters, we shall first de-
scribe the nature of the measure used, indicate how similar ratings
have been employed by official regulatory bodies in determining
the eligibility and amortizable properties of corporate bonds for
investment institutions, and review some of the weaknesses of the
yield spread as well as of alternative market ratings. The next
section presents statistics on the volume and characteristics of is-
sues in different market-rating classes, and traces changes in their
distributions over significant periods. It includes, among other
things, an investigation of whether the market, like the rating
agencies, was able to predict the deterioration in investment qual-
ity that occurred in the 1920's. The chapter closes with a section
on the default and yield experience on corporate bonds.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Market ratings of the type analyzed in this chapter have been ap-
plied in the insurance and savings bank fields to determine the
amortizable and eligibility properties of corporate bond invest-
ments. The market rating recommends itself because it is easily
computed and has comprehensive coverage; its computation re-
quires only a knowledge of the promised yield of the issue and an
appropriate schedule of basic yields on high-grade investments
against which the promised yield may be compared. Requisite
data for the computation of the market rating were available for
80 to 95 percent of the par-amount total of all straight bond issuesMARKET RATING 279
outstanding during the period 1900—1944. (The total includes
bonds in default, which were deliberately not rated.) Issues rated
by the market thus compare fairly closely with the 92 to 99 percent
of aggregate outstandings rated by the investment agencies in the
period from January 1, 1920 to 1944. On the average over the
period studied, about half of the total volume of all rated out-
standings had a market rating of under 1 percent; that group will
usually be referred to hereafter as "high grade."
Unfortunately, the practical disadvantages of the market rating
are fully as important as the advantages, and have recently led to
its abandonment by the life insurance commissioners. Yield
spreads are at best very rough measures of the intrinsic quality of
bond issues, since they are influenced by differences in market-
ability, taxability, convertibility, call prices, etc. It is quite diffi-
cult to correct for such differences and no adjustment has been
attempted in this report.
A second undesirable feature of the market rating is its in-
stability. The volatility of the rating is particularly troublesome
in practical applications since it precludes establishing a single ob-
jective yield standard that will separate high-grade from low-grade
investments in all years. For example, a market rating of under
1 percent included 60 percent of the par-amount total of rated
outstandings in 1928, but only 25 percent in the depressed thirties.
This suggests the possible use of some variant of the yield spread
as a market rating, a matter requiring more attention than can be
given it in the present work. One of the important consequences
of the instability of the market rating (considered as an absolute
yield differential) was that the rating improved on bonds offered
in the late twenties while the intrinsic quality of the offerings cle-
dined. Here the market contrasted unfavorably with the invest-
ment agencies, which assigned low ratings to an increasing pro-
portion of bonds offered in the late twenties. Over the short pe-
riods spanned by most business cycles, however, there was less
systematic upgrading and downgrading by the market than by
the investment agencies or by a strictly enforced legal list such
as Maine's. Although the market rating was unduly influenced by
the speculative excesses of the late twenties (and by the depres-
sion psychology of the thirties), it was usually more stable over
business cycles than most other quality measures examined in this
report.
A third disadvantage of the market rating is that it is inappli.280 MARKET RATiNG
cable to a substantial number of the smaller nonmarketable issues,
the very ones for which a quality test is most needed. In practice,
regulatory bodies must either infer the yield spreads for non-
marketable issues from the yields of "comparable" marketable
issues—obviously a difficult process—or fall back upon some other
method of rating. Although coverage in terms of the par amounts
outstanding was good (market quotations being obtainable for 80
to 95 percent of the total in the different years), the number of is-
sues not rated was considerable: market quotations were usually
unavailable for about half of the issues outstanding. Moreover,
there was a progressive downward drift in coverage after 1936
owing to the growth of nonmarketable private placements. This
development became even more pronounced after 1944 (the last
year covered by our records) and was an important factor leading
to the abandonment of the yield test by the life insurance com-
missioners in 1953.
Despite its disadvantages, the market rating is not without merit
as a quality measure for those issues for which it can be computed,
and it was possible to compute it for about 85 percent of the par-
amount total of outstandings in the years before the agency rat-
ings and legal lists became available. In later years most of the
issues rated high grade by the market were similarly rated by the
investment agencies and the compilers, of the legal lists, and most
of the high grades under the different rating systems had similar
characteristics with respect to size of obligor and issue, market-
ability, lien position, etc. Like the other ratings, market ratings
assigned at offering and on quadrennial observation dates proved
to be good indicators of subsequent default experience. In gen-
eral, the lower the quality of an issue as rated prospectively by
the market, the greater was the risk of default observed in retro-
spect. Moreover, the realized yields on defaulted issues calculated
from offering to default were usually higher for issues rated by the
market as high grade at offering than for those rated as low grade,
and the loss rates on the high grades were considerably lower.
The general pattern of the relationships among market ratings
and the various measures of subsequent investor experience thus
resembles roughly what was observed in the preceding chapters on
the legal lists and composite agency ratings. By the nature of the
measure used, there is a direct relationship between weighted
average promised yields on rated outstandings and their market
ratings—the yield spreads assigned by the market. Realized yieldsMARKET RATING 281
show a similar pattern, being higher the larger the yield spread
(i.e., better, the poorer the quality). In short, on the average in-
vestors obtained lower returns on high-grade issues than on low
grades, whether the measure of quality was the yield spread as-
signed by the market, legal status, or the ratings assigned by the
agencies.
Because of the positive correlation between market ratings on
the one hand and promised and realized yields on the other, no
significant relationship is observed between the market ratings at
offering and the life-span loss rates (differences between yields
promised at offering and yields realized from offering to extin-
guishment). For large issues, where the data are most complete,
capital gains were quite general but were virtually independent of
the market rating. The market rating is sometimes conceived of
as a pure risk premium or forecast of the loss rate. Under that in-
terpretation, averages of risk premiums and loss rates should be
equal for securities accurately priced in the market. But average
risk premiums were actually higher than average loss rates, a fact
which implies that the market either undervalued issues at offer-
ing, or exacted a premium for risk bearing. In addition, the in-
dependence of the average market ratings and loss rates implies
that the undervaluation was greatest at the poor end of the quality
scale. To put the matter differently, corporate bond investors, on
the average and over long periods, obtained higher returns than
those promised on the very best securities outstanding in the
market, and the excess return was usually higher for the poorer
quality ratings.
Various explanations for this phenomenon may be offered; the
one favored here is based on the observation that institutional
investors frequently shy away from riskier bonds, irrespective of
the yield offered. For many years the corporate bond market has
been dominated by large institutional investors. Even though
many of the investment intermediaries are of sufficient size to
balance default losses on low-grade issues against capital gains on
others, under existing rules and procedures they may be tem-
porarily embarrassed by the heavy default incidence on. such issues,
even if no loss ultimately occurs. To protect themselves against
heavy defaults, institutional investors, managers of personal trust
accounts, etc., generally purchase only high-grade issues. Other
noninstitutional investors, who purchase at higher yields, are
thus able to exact a premium for risk bearing on the low grades,282 MARKET RATING
over and above the pure premium needed to offset the losses that
might result from the high incidence of default.
NATURE, USES, AND LIMITATIONS
OF MARKET RATINGS
Whenever possible in this investigation, market ratings were as-
signed to offerings of all straight corporate issues included in the
large and small issues samples, and, for both samples, to all out-
standing issues that were in good standing both at the beginning
and end of selected chronological periods. Since the market rating
is defined as the difference between the promised yield of an issue
and the promised yield of outstanding issues of highest grade
with the same term to maturity, two elements are needed to de-
termine a market rating: (1) adequate price data for the calcula-
tion of the promised yield of the issue, and (2) an appropriate
schedule or curve showing the relationship between the promised
yields and maturities of high-grade issues. Prices needed to cal-
culate the yields could be obtained for virtually all large issues
and for a substantial number of the small issues (see below), so
that the par-amount coverage of the data with respect to market
rating is quite good. The basic yield-maturity schedules were con-
structed annually from first quarter price data; for each high-
grade issue, the average of monthly high and low sale prices was
used if available; otherwise the average of high bid and low
asking prices was used. Annual yield-maturity schedules for high-
grade corporate bonds and a detailed description of the method
of construction are given in David Durand's Basic Yields of Cor-
porate Bonds, 1900—1942.' The promised yields of the quadrennial
outstandings were constructed on the basis of price data exactly
comparable to those used for the yield-maturity schedules; prom-
ised yields at offering were usually based on offering prices (cf.
Chapter 1).
To determine the market rating of a given issue, we simply
read off the basic yield corresponding to the maturity of the issue
from the yield-maturity schedule for the appropriate year, and
subtracted the basic yield from the promised yield of the issue.
Chart 15 illustrates the procedure for three issues outstanding at
the beginning of 1940, one selling to yield 2.0 percent and matur-
ing in seven years, a second yielding 2.8 percent and maturing in
iNationalBureau of Economic Research (Financial Research Program),
Technical Paper 3, June 1942.NATURE, USES AND LIMITATIONS 283
cen years, and a third yielding 3.2 percent and maturing in thirty
years. The market rating assigned the ten-year maturity, for ex-
ample, was 0.8 percent, the difference between the promised yield
of 2.8 percent and the basic yield on high grades in 1940 of 2.0
percent. Since the promised and realized yields for the chronologi-
cal periods of this investigation are all based on first quarter price
CHART15—Basic Yield-to-Maturity Curve for Corporate Bonds,
First Quarter 1940, and Illustration of Market Rating
0
Promised yietd fl Market rating
Bask yield curve from "Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942," by David
Durand (National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, Techni-
cal Paper 3, June 1942).
data,the timing of the basic yield schedules is strictly appropriate
for them (i.e. first quarter price data were used in assigning market
ratings at the beginning of 1900, 1904, etc.).
In assigning the market ratings at offering, the annual basic
yield schedule for the first quarter of the year of offering was used,
except for offerings with terms to maturity of five years or less
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curred (1917, 1919—21, 1928, 1931—35 and 1938). In such cases,
monthly basic yield values were obtained by interpolation.2
Official Uses of Yield Spreads
as Market Ratings
Perhaps the most important official use of a market rating analo-
gous to the type employed in this report was by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (N.A.I.C.) in determining the
amortizable properties of investments of insurance companies. Al-
though the so-called "yield test" has been abandoned, the pro-
cedures recommended by the Committee on Valuation of Securi-
ties of the N.A.I.C. for annual statements dated December 81,
1951 illustrate the type of use once made of the market rating in
the insurance field.3
As has been indicated in Chapter 3, a corporate bond was ruled
to be fully amortizable for insurance companies (i.e. it could be
carried at amortized book value and the full promised yield could
be carried into the income account) if the issue was rated in the
first four grades by at least two of the rating agencies, or if, failing
the rating test, it met a yield test based on a market rating. In the
words of the commissioners: "...Bondsnot in default as to princi-
pal or interest, which are certified by the insurer submitting the
statement to be amply secured, shall be so deemed and shall
be amortizable provided they are not income or perpetual bonds
and provided ... [theyarej corporate bonds on which the yields
to maturities based on December 31, 1949 and on December 81,
1950 Association Values do not, in the first case, exceed 1.70% and
in the second case 1.50% plus the yield for comparable maturities
of fully taxable unrestricted U.S. Government Treasury obliga-
tions at the respective dates. Bonds which were not outstanding
on December 31, 1949, shall be deemed amply secured and amor-
2Theinterpolating series for 1900—1937, inclusive, were taken from Fred-
erick R. Macaulay's Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements
of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938), Table 10. Commercial paper
rates in New York City were used as interpolators for maturities of under five
years, and yields of American railroad bonds adjusted for economic drift
for the longer-term issues. For later years, Macaulay's commercial paper series
(as extended by the National Bureau of Economic Research) and the Standard
and Poor's Corporation index of yields of high-grade corporate and municipal
bonds were used as interpolating series.
3ThePrinciples of Valuation of the Committee on Valuation of Securities
(National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1951).NATURE, USES AND LIMITATIONS 285
tizable if the yield to maturity based on December 31, 1950 Asso-
ciation Values does not exceed 1.50% plus the yield for compara-
ble maturities of fully taxable unrestricted U.S. Government
Treasury obligations."4 The yields to maturity based on the "As-
sociation Values" referred to are synonymous with the promised
yields of this report.
One of the principal problems that arose in applying the yield
test was the need for frequent revision. For example, when the
test was first applied by the N.A.I.C. in 1942 many rail issues were
selling at extremely low prices (high yields), so that the yield test
for year-end reports was fixed by adding 3.90 percent to the Treas-
ury yield on comparable maturities. As the market for corporates
improved, the yield spread was gradually narrowed to 2.90 per-
cent in 1944, 2.10 percent in 1945, 1.80 percent in 1946, 1.70 per-
cent in 1949, and finally 1.50 percent in 1950—52. Because of the
essentially arbitrary nature of the yield test, the need for frequent
revision, the difficulties involved in applying the test to non-
marketable issues, and the possibility that the yield of an issue
may reflect factors other than its quality, the yield test was aban-
doned in 1953 and replaced by various asset and earnings tests
similar to those used in compiling the legal lists.5 At the present
time, to be fully amortizable an issue must meet an agency rating
test or satisfy one of several alternative groups of financial ratio
tests specified by the life insurance commissioners.
The market rating has also been applied officially in Massa-
chusetts by the Savings Bank Investment Fund, a mutual fund
established for savings banks in 1945. The enabling act for that
organization provides that its funds may be invested in mortgages
on real estate, public funds authorized for savings bank invest-
ment, and in corporate bonds and notes, provided they are not in
default at the time of purchase and are quoted on recognized
securities exchanges. The act provides further that "the Corpora-
tion shall not purchase bonds having a yield greater than two and
one-half per cent in excess of the return on fully taxable United
States Government securities of approximately similar maturity
if such purchase at the time thereof would cause more than 10
percent of the Corporation's assets to be invested in such bonds."°
4lbid., pp. 7ff.
5FinalReport to Insurance Companies, Societies and Associations (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1953), pp. vi—xi.
6MassachusettsActs of 1945, c. 283, §12.286 MARKET RATING
The yield tests used by the N.A.I.C. and the Massachusetts Sav-
ings Bank Investment Fund are conceptually equivalent to the
market ratings of this study except that the official tests are' based
on the yields of fully taxable Treasury bonds, whereas ours refer
to high-grade corporates. At present, Treasury yields have a defi-
nite advantage over corporate yields since Treasury bonds are
more actively traded and are free from the risk of default. In the
past, however, Treasury bonds were frequently outstanding in
small amounts and had a very thin market and scattered maturi-
ties. In addition, the taxation of United States Government bonds
under the federal income tax was different for different issues. It
was, therefore, not possible to determine suitable yield curves for
Treasury bonds for the full period covered by this investigation,
and the curves for high-grade corporates were used instead.
Other Types of Market Rating
The use of the yield spread as an approximate measure of the
market's rating of the quality of bond issues is suggested by the
classical theory of investment values (cf. Chapter 2), according to
which, other things being equal, the promised yield is comprised
of two elements: (1) the basic yield on "riskiess" investments hav-
ing the same term to maturity, and (2) a pure risk premium as-
signed by the market to cover the risk of default loss. Other types
of market ratings are easily formulated, and while it will not be
possible to investigate most of them here, a brief indication of
their principal properties may provide possible leads for future
investigators. The alternative types of market rating include the
market price of the issue, its promised yield, the current yield, a
ranking of promised yield (or yield spread), and a ratio of the
promised yield (or, possibly, the yield spread) to the basic rate.
Also of possible interest is some system of quartile, decile, or per-
centile ranking based on one or another of the different types of
market rating.
Market prices were used at one time in New York state to de-
termine whether or not corporate bonds were amortizable for
life insurance companies, but prices are conceptually the least
satisfactory of the suggested market ratings.7 The principal diffi-
7In1938 the New York authorities were concerned about the low prices
of many rail bonds deemed amortizable under the agency rating test (the
only test applied at that time). Issues were therefore held to be fully amor-
tizable for year.end balance sheet purposes only if they sold at prices ofNATURE, USES AND LIMITATIONS 287
culty with the market price is that it reflects the coupon rate of
the issue as well as the basic yield to maturity and the market's ap-
praisal of risk. Consider, for example, two issues, Series A and
Series B, both equally secured under a blanket mortgage, both
maturing in ten years, and both identical in all other respects ex-
cept that Series A bears a coupon rate of 4 percent and Series B
a rate of 5 percent. If Series A and B are selling to yield, say, 4
percent, Series A will sell at par while Series B, because of its
higher coupon rate, will sell at 108.
The promised yield is superior to the price as a market rating
in that the yield automatically adjusts for differences in coupon
rates. Thus Series A and Series B in the above illustration would
sell at yields determined by the market's appraisal of risk and the
general level of interest rates, and since these factors are the same
for the two issues, they would both sell on approximately the same
yield basis. On the other hand, the promised yield reflects the
underlying structure of interest rates (the basic yield-maturity
schedule), and thus is governed by the maturity of the issue as
well as by its quality. The basic yield-maturity schedule is, of
course, not stable over time but fluctuates with market conditions.
It follows that promised yields can only be interpreted as a rank-
ing of the market's appraisals of the quality of different issues if
all of them are outstanding at approximately the same point in
time and if all of them have approximately the same maturities.
Since the promised yield is a function of the term to maturity, and
since the function (i.e., the basic yield structure) shifts over time,
promised yields are inappropriate for comparing market ap-
praisals of issues with different maturities and for intertemporal
comparisons.
The current yield, or ratio of the coupon rate to the market
price, is mathematically equivalent to the promised yield of a per-
petual bond. It is thus subject to all of the weaknesses of the prom-
ised yield as a market rating and has the added disadvantage of
disregarding the maturity date specified in the bond contract. We
shall, however, use the current yield later in the chapter when as-
signing market ratings to issues five years and one year before de-
fault. The use of the current yield at such times is suggested by the
fact that the maturity date of an issue becomes indefinite as it
50 or above (later raised to 55 and finally to 60 in 1941). In 1942 the price
formula was replaced by the yield test referred to above (cf. footnote 4 and
related text).288 MARKET RATING
approaches default. For issues near default, the promised yield
to maturity, the yield spread, or any other rating based on them
is unrealistic, since all of these measures. are constructed on the
assumption that the issues. will be paid in full at maturity. Ma-
turity dates are usually disregarded in the treatment of bond
issues in corporate reorganizations. In the absence of reliable in-
formation about the ultimate repayment date, the current yield
provides about as good an indication as can be obtained of the
market's appraisal of the prospects for treatment of the default.
Quartile, decile, or percentile rankings of promised yields or
yield spreads might be constructed for purposes of drawing up lists
of eligible or amortizable securities that would include a fixed
proportion of the issues outstanding in the market (cf. Chapter 6,
where we have used essentially this technique in drawing up so-
called "equivalent" lists of securities). Under such a rating sys-
tem, for example, issues in the top decile grade (the best 10
percent of the issues) might be assigned the rating I, issues in the
next decile grade, the rating ii, and so on. The difficulty is that
the intrinsic quality of the majority of the outstanding issues may
drift off as in the twenties, or the market's appraisal of the risk of
the aggregate may shift as in the thirties (cf. Table 7 for changes
in yield spreads over time). Since quartile or percentile rankings
are independent of such changes they do not reflect variations in
the general attitude of the market toward risk.8
Ratios of promised yields (or yield spreads) to the basic rates on
high-grade issues deserve more attention than they can be given
in this report. According to the classical theory of investment
values, the simple yield spread, or algebraic difference between
the promised yield and basic rate, would provide the best meas-
ure of the risk premium for issues properly priced in the market,
since the yield is conceived of as the algebraic sum of the pure
rate of interest and the risk premium. It is a matter of record,
however, that yield spreads frequently narrow when basic rates
fall, and widen when basic rates rise (cf. Table 8), perhaps be-
cause of the efforts of investors to compensate for changes in basic
S The percentiles rather than the percentile rankings reflect changes in the
market's attitudes toward risk. For example, Chart 17 shows that the
percentile stood at 0.8 percent in 1920, dropped to about 0.5 percent as the
market became more optimistic in 1928, rose to about 1.2 percent when it
became pessimistic in 1932, and dropped below 0.5 percent in 1944. The same
point is illustrated in Table 53, which presents the variable percentages of
total outstandings falling within market-rating classes.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 289
rates. To the extent that yield spreads fluctuate systematically
with the level of interest rates, a ratio of the promised yield or
yield spread to the basic rate might serve as a better measure than
the yield spread alone of the market's appraisal of the risk of
future default; but such ratios have the disadvantages that their
significance for short-term issues would be doubtful (particularly
when basic yields on short terms are very low), and that they
would not be directly comparable with the loss rates.
The yield spreads chosen for special investigation in this re-
port are easily computed; moreover, they have been used by state
regulatory bodies for the control of institutional investors, have
been discussed extensively in the theoretical literature, and are
directly comparable with the loss rates. (Certain other advantages
of the yield differentials are discussed below in the section on mar-
ket ratings and business cycles.) We have seen, however, that they
serve at bes.t as very rough indicators of the market's appraisals
of risk.0 It is hoped that future investigators will examine the rela-
tive merits of the other types of market rating systems as indica-
tors of default risk and default loss.
VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ISSUES
CLASSIFIED BY MARKET RATING
As with agency ratings. and legal lists, those who attempt to use
market ratings as a guide in security selection are concerned with
the volume of securities meeting a specific standard or test, the
stability of that volume over time, and the principal characteristics
of the included issues. Such matters are treated next. Comparisons
of the default and yield experience of issues in different market
rating classifications then follow.
Outstandings
Data on the number and par amount of outstanding issues in
selected market-rating classifications are displayed in Charts 16
9Themarket ratings used here are based solely on market prices or yields,
and are thus influenced by many factors other than market appraisals of
default risk, e.g. the size of the obligor and of the issue, the length of time
the issue has been outstanding, special tax provisions, call, conversion, and
warrant features, etc. The yield spread is subject to the further objection
that the basic rates are those of high-grade corporate bonds, which are not
entirely free of default risk. An additional objection already noted is that the
promised yield (and yield spread) is meaningless for bonds approaching de-
fault. Adjustments could presumably be made for several of the disturbing ele-






























































































































































































































AVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 291













Under 0.5% (highest grade)










and 17, and the percentage distributions of the par-amount totals
are given in Table 53. These materials, like our other data cover-
ing the detailed characteristics of corporate bonds, are universe
estimates for all straight bonds outstanding. The estimates were
obtained by combining the data for the large and small issues
samples, after adjustment of the latter for sample size.
A glance at the table and charts reveals several interesting fea-
tures of the market rating. For one thing, the rating could be
computed for a substantially larger proportion of the par-amount
total of outstandings (a high of 90 percent at the beginning of
1924 and a low of 74 percent at the beginning of 1944) than for
the total number of issues (under 63 percent in 1932 and slightly
over 32 percent in 1908); likewise, for a much larger proportion of
large issues than of small issues. The table shows that defaulted
issues were responsible for a substantial part of the issues not
rated in the later years, especially in 1936—44. Exclusive of the de-
faulted issues, adequate price data were lacking on a.n average
over the period 1900—1936 for only 4 percent by volume of the
large issues, but for 33 percent of the small issues. The propor-
tions fell rather steadily from 1908 through 1936, especially for
the small issues, but rose from 3.6 percent in 1936 to 11.1 percent
in 1944 for large issues and from 13.5 percent to 34.8 percent for
small issues. From the point of view of the regulatory authorities,
this implies that a yield test would be inapplicable to a substan-
tial number of issues (particularly those of small size), so that it
must be supplemented in some fashion, such as by the assignment
of conventional market values based on the yields of similar issues.
The yield test is more easily applied to large issues than to small,
yet it is precisely for the small issues that a yield testis. most
needed because of the absence of such information as agency rat-
ings, earnings coverage, etc. In addition, yield tests have become
increasingly difficult to apply in recent years because of the declin-
ing importance of the secondary bond market with the growth
of private placements. Private placements occurred infrequently
during the period covered by our records, but the effects of this
type of offering can be detected in the aforementioned gradual
rise of the proportion of issues with inadequate price information
from 1936 to 1944. Comparable figures for later years are not
available, but prices needed to compute the market rating at the
present time (1956) would probably be unobtainable for over halfYOLUME AND CHARACTERISTiCS 293
the par-amount total of outstanding issues and for a considerably
larger proportion of the total number of issues.
Another interesting feature of the data on market ratings is
the pronounced shifts that have occurred in the proportion of
outstandings rated high grade by the market. (In the remainder of
this section percentages will be based on all issues rated or in de-
fault, i.e. all issues other than. those classified as information lack-
ing.) For example, the proportion that had market ratings of
under 1 percent averaged over 60 percent through 1916, dropped
to slightly under 40 percent during the money market panic of
1920, rose again to 60 percent in the late twenties, fell to 25 per-
cent in the depressed thirties, and stood at 42 percent in 1944.
On the average a market rating standard arbitrarily set to select
as high grade all issues with yield differentials under 1.0 percent
would include approximately half of the par-amount total of
rated outstandings, but the proportion has fluctuated widely
around this level. Two types of movements are clearly discernible
in the proportions: short-run fluctuations associated primarily
with changes in basic yields on high-grade bonds, and secular
drifts reflecting the market's changing attitude towards risk. Over
the four-year intervals of Table .53, the proportions of outstand-
ings rated high grade by the market were closely related (in-
versely) to the level of basic yields, a point mentioned in Chap-
ters 1 and 2, and earlier in this chapter in the discussion of pos-
sible defects of the yield spread as a measure of intrinsic quality.
Thus, over the eleven four-year periods within 1900—1944, the
proportion of total rated outstandings of the combined industries
that had a market rating under 1 percent moved oppositely to the
basic yields for thirty-year maturities nine times (cf. Table 8), and
moved in the same direction only twice: 1900—1903, a period for
which market behavior was classified earlier as. doubtful (cf. page
134); and in 1932—35, when basic rates on high grades were
depressed by the easy money policy of the federal
The counts were approximately the same for each industry and
size group except industrials, where the proportion rated high
grade moved inversely to basic yields six times and directly five
times. The short-run sensitivity of absolute yield differentials to
basic rates suggests that some other concept of market rating,
such as a ratio of promised yield to basic rate, might prove a more
stable measure under certain conditions. In the final analysis,
however, the usefulness of a rating depends largely upon the de-294 MARKET RATING
TABLE 53—Percentage Distributions of Outstandings among
High and Low Market Ratings, Quadrennially 1900—1944
NO RATING














1900 52.6% 36.2% 0.4% 10.8%
1904 56.8 27.5 0.3 15.4
1908 44.1 35.1 0.4 20.4
1912 55.5 26.3 1.7 16.5
1916 50.7 29.6 6.1 13.6
1920 34.0 46.4 5.2 14.4
1924 45.6 44.7 2.3 7.4
1928 55.5 34.3 2.8 7.4
1932 23.9 .66.0 4.0 6.1
1936 23.8 56.3 14.9 5.0
1940 25.5 50.5 15.3 8.7
1944 36.7 37.1 13.0 13.2
Railroads
1900 61.3 31.5 0.4 6.8
1904 74.6 17.3 0.1 8.0
1908 63.2 27.0 0.4 9.4
1912 76.3 16.2 0.8 6.7
1916 64.1 20.6 7.9 7.4
1920 46.4 43.1 4.0 6.5
1924 65.8 29.0 2.1 3.1
1928 79.4 13.4 3.2 4.0
1932 21.8 71.7 2.2 4.3
1936 31.1 42.9 21.6 4.4
1940 9.0 60.6 27.9 2.5
1944 16.9 55.8 26.0 1.3
PublicUtilities
1900 26.5 50.2 0.0 23.3
1904 32.7 32.9 0.1 34.3
1908 9.7 48.4 0.7 41.2
1912 23.9 44.7 2.7 28.7
1916 28.3 47.2 4.4 20.1
1920 9.4 56.7 8.4 25.5
1924 28.8 56.9 3.0 11.3
1928 47.0 43.3 2.8 6.9
1932 32.1 58.1 3.5 6.3
1936 20.4 69.5 6.1 4.0
1940 41.0 42.4 5.8 10.8
1944 51.8 24.5 3.5 20.2
Based on Tables 13 and 14 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all
large (straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjustedTABLE53
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(concluded)
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1900 3.2% 62.3% 1.3% 33.2%
1904 7.6 68.9 1.5 22.0
1908 23.1 46.7 0.2 30.0
1912 33.3 30.7 3.5 32.5
1916 45.7 27.3 2.7 24.3
1920 46.2 33.3 1.8 18.7
1924 27.1 60.5 1.6 10.8
1928 25.8 57.5 2.0 14.7
1932 9.5 71.7 9.2 9.6
1936 12.9 55.2 21.9 10.0
1940 27.4 45.0 6.4 21.2
1944 47.5 21.1 4.8 26.6
LargeIssues
1900 60.5 36.5 0.2 2.8
1904 64.6 30.1 0.2 5.1
1908 51.9 39.6 0.4 8.1
1912 66.1 28.0 1.2 4.7
1916 61.8 27.6 6.5 4.1
1920 40.0 51.6 4.2 4.2
1924 52.0 44.5 2.0 1.5
1928 61.9 32.3 2.5 3.3
1932 27.2 66.9 2.9 3.0
1936 26.0 56.5 13.9 3.6
1940 27.1 49.9 15.5 7.5
1944 39.0 37.2 12.7 11.1
SmallIssues
1900 37.8 35.5 0.7 26.0
1904 39.2 21.5 0.5 38.8
1908 25.0 24.2 0.6 50.2
1912 28.9 21.9 3.1 46.1
1916 20.3 35.1 5.2 39.4
1920 15.3 30.3 8.4 46.0
1924 24.2 45.4 3.4 27.0
1928 29.8 42.1 3.7 24.4
1932 7.1 61.2 9.8 21.9
1936 10.6 55.2 20.7 13.5
1940 11.3 56.1 14.3 18.3
1944 12.2 36.5 16.5 34.8
quadrennially to universe totals. The percents in default are from Tables
A-17 and A-18 of Volume of Financing.296 MARKET RATING
fault and yield experience of issues classified under it—matters
to be examined later in the chapter. Moreover, we shall find that
the absolute yield differentials were more stable over business
cycles than most other quality ratings examined in this report,
despite their sensitivity to basic yields.
Secular drifts in the relative volumehigh-grade outstandings
were caused in part by changes in the attitude of the market to-
ward issues of different industry groups. For example, the appar-
ent downgrading of all issues in the thirties, when basic yields
on high-grade bonds were very low, was caused mainly by the
market's adverse reaction to the depression experience of the rails.
But similar, although less pronounced, changes may be traced in
each of the other major industry groups in that period, suggesting
a general shift in the market's attitude toward the risks inherent
in corporate bonds. As earlier chapters have indicated, a general
downgrading in the thirties can also be detected in the agency rat-
ings and legal lists. A comparative analysis of the stability of the
various systems of ratings over this and other periods will be pre-
sented in Chapter 6.
The market—along with the agencies and the legal lists—rather
consistently favored the rails until the Great Depression, judg-
ing by the proportion of issues with market ratings of under 1
percent. Rails had the highest proportion in eight of the twelve
quadrennial years covered by our records and the second highest
in two other years. In fact, the proportion of rail o'utstandings
having market ratings of under 1 percent did not drop below
that of both utilities and industrials until 1940. Curiously enough,
in view of their depression experience, the rails were highly re-
garded by the market as late as 1936 (for rails, 33 percent of the
total volume of issues on which information was available had a
market rating of less than 1 percent at that time, as compared with
21 percent of the utilities, and 14 percent of industrials). On the
average the market rated utility and industrial issues almost
equally. In 1944, 65 percent of both rated utilities and industrials
fell in the under 1 percent class, as compared with 17 percent of
the rails. This contrasts sharply with the market's. ordering of
the quality of the issues in 1900, when the rails were far ahead
of the utilities and the utilities far ahead of the industrials.
A final point to be noted from Table 53 is that the proportion
of the aggregate volume of large issues with market ratings of
under 1 percent was consistently above the corresponding pro--w-
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portion of small issues. Moreover, the gap between the propor-
tions, although volatile, gradually widened. (In 1900 the propor-
tions were 62 percent for the large rated issues and 51 percent for
the small; in 1928 the corresponding proportions were 64 percent
and 39 percent; in 1944 they were 44 percent and 19 percent.) In
part, the differentials between large and small issues probably
reflect the broader market enjoyed by the large issues and the
premium paid for "marketability", or ease of liquidation; but the
widening of the gap can hardly be explained on the basis of
marketability alone. A similar widening was found in the propo.r.
tion of issues rated high and low grade by the agencies (cf. Table
27 and the related text discussion), suggesting that the market,
like the agencies, may have placed increasing reliance on the sta-
bility and financial strength of large business corporations in the
later period. (See, however, Chapter 8, where it is shown that the
size of the issue and of the issuing corporation are not so closely
correlated as might be expected on purely a priori grounds.)
Offerings
Percentage distributions by market rating of the par-amount
totals of straight bonds offered during the various quadrennial
periods are presented in Table 54. As was to be expected, these
materials are roughly similar to the related data on outstandings.
An interesting difference is that through 1928—31 the proportions
of quadrennial offerings of rated issues with market ratings of
under 1 percent (obtained by eliminating offerings for which in-
formation on market rating was lacking) were consistently below
those of outstandings in the same rating class at the beginning of
the corresponding periods. The same was usually the case within
major industry groups: through 1931 the proportion of total of-
ferings having a yield spread of under 1 percent was below the
corresponding proportion for outstandings in eighteen of the
twenty-four comparisons possible from the data in the tables, a
statistically significant result.
So far as we have been able to determine, the explanation is
that the market was usually willing to pay a premium for sea-
soneci issues, so that they sold at a relative advantage as compared
with new bond offerings. Through 1931, new-money offerings ex-
ceeded repayments,'° and the new issues were generally floated
at yields above those of old issues. The situation was reversed,
10SeeVolume of Financing, Chapter 3 and Table A-12.298 MARKET RATING
however, after 1931. From1932 on, repayments usually exceeded
new-money offerings, and total outstandings declined. Moreover,
outstandingissues were calledand refunded in large volume at
the low rates of interest of the thirties. Since only the best of the
TABLE 54—Percentage Distributions of Offerings among High





















49.7 40.5 1.2 50.1
46.6 45.0 1.0 56.8
57.6 30.7 7.6 58.3
60.4 26.1 15.3 54.9
74.2 14.0 7.6 71.6
Based on Table 70 of Statistical
(straight) corporate issues, and for
to Universe totals.
outstanding issues sold in the open market in that period suf-
ficiently close to their call prices to make refunding attractive to
the issuing corporations, the new refunding issues could usually
be floated at yields under the averages prevailing on outstandings.














































78.4 6.3 25.6 66.0
55.2 3.1 67.0 31.2
41.7 3.4 81.1 17.7










































































Measures: par-amount data for
10 percent of small issues adjusted
all large
annuallyVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 299
offerings rated top grade by the market were consistently above
the corresponding proportions for total outstandings. Funded
debt has expanded rapidly since 1944, and most of the older issues
have recovered from their depression lows. Although comprehen-
sive data for the recent period are not available, examination
of a number of offerings indicates that the relationship between
the yields of new and old issues has reverted to the pre-depression
pattern. The implication is that short-run trading profits may
frequently be obtained by those who purchase new issues at of-
fering and hold them until they have seasoned on the market.
Table 54 reveals that the market ranked the quality of the of-
ferings of the major industry groups in roughly the same order
as outstandings. Through 1931 the top position was assigned to
the rails, and second place to the utilities. The single exception
was the period 1912—15, when for industrials the proportion of
the volume of rated offerings with market ratings under 1 per-
cent slightly exceeded that for utilities. After 1936 the market
assigned the top position to new offerings of utility bonds and the
bottom position to rails. The agencies also assigned low ratings to
rail offerings after 1936 (cf. pages 154 f.).
Drifts in market attitudes towards risk that were detected in
outstandings may be traced in the data for new offerings. Judging
by the percentages of the par-amount totals of offerings with mar-
ket ratings under 1 percent, the market appears to have been
fairly conservative until 1924 and less conservative thereafter. As
was mentioned, the principal difference observed in the data on
offerings and outstandings is that a large proportion of the volume
of new issues coming onto the market in the thirties was rated
high grade, whereas older issues were downgraded.
The tendency of the market to rate bonds up in the late twenties
is particularly interesting in view of our earlier findings that the
intrinsic quality of the offerings, as measured by agency ratings
and subsequent default experience, actually deteriorated over
that period (Chapters 2 and 3). To bring this point into sharper
focus, detailed annual data for the 1920's on the percentages of
offerings rated high grade by the market and the agencies have
been brought together in Table 55. Annual data on offerings are
erratic and the percentages behave accordingly; but if minor
variations are ignored, the table shows quite clearly that the pro-
portion of the aggregate volume of bond offerings rated by the
market as high grade rose for issues of the combined industries300 MARKET RATING
and for each of the major industry components. In contrast, the
proportions rated high grade by the agencies showed little trend
up to 1928 and then declined (Chapter 3). It would appear from
this evidence that the market, unlike the rating agencies, was
overly optimistic during the late twenties and was unaware of the
gradual deterioration in the intrinsic quality of new bond of-
ferings.
TABLE 55—Proportions of Offerings Adjudged High Grade:












1920 1.7% 87.6% 6.5% 87.0%
1921 2.5 84.7 6.1 99.8
1922 35.0 75.3 46.1 91.1
1923 19,6 81.7 60.2 91.8
1924 39.0 83.9 79.4 97.9
1925 29.0 83.3 51.9 79.7
1926 40.0 81.8 67.8 82.0
1927 55.0 82.3 66.5 83.9
1928 49.7 73.0 76.7 76.7
1929 55.8 73.8 78.6 92.8
PublicUtilities Industrials
1920 0.4 70.8 0.8 99.0
1921 0.0 80.4 2.0 77.5
1922 38.6 67.2 25.5 75.6
192,3 22.9 78.7 0.0 82.3
1924 23.3 81.2 18.4 72.2
1925 38.0 89.2 3.1 76.1
1926 44.6 85.7 26.0 76.3
1927 65.2 81.3 31.7 83.3
1928 51.0 70.7 28.7 74.9
1929 60.6 70.3 33.7 67.9
Based on Tables 52 and 70 of Statistical Measures, for offerings rated by
the market or the agencies, respectively: par-amount data for all large (straight)
corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted annually to
Universe totals.
Characteristics of Issues in
Different Rating Classes
The market for corporate obligations is essentially amorphous,
consisting as it does of a complex system of trading relationships
among myriads of investors and traders who set the prices of cor-VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 301
porate bonds. Because of the complexity of the market, it is im-
possible to determine by direct observation the processes and
standards employed in rating corporate bonds. As in the case of
agency ratings, these must be determined inferentially from an
examination of the characteristics of issues rated high grade or
low grade by the market.
Table 56 presents for this purpose distributions of straight
bond outstandings with market ratings of under 1 percent, and
those with ratings of 1 percent and over, by selected character-
istics. As might be expected, the variables emphasized by the mar-
ket in its rating system are quite similar to the ones stressed by
the investment agencies and the compilers of the legal lists. For
example, in each of the years for which breakdowns are presented,
substantially larger proportions of issues with market ratings un-
der 1 percent than of issues with market ratings of 1 percent and
over were legal for savings bank investment in Massachusetts
and were rated in the first four grades by the agencies. Moreover,
the market—like the legallists and the agencies—typically
assigned top positions to the large, well secured, actively traded
issues.
One of the interesting points brought out by the table is that a
yield test set to include issues with market ratings of less than
1 percent was more selective than an investment rating test includ-
ing issues in the first four grades, and that both were less selec-
tive than the Massachusetts legal list. The agencies' top four
grades included practically 100 percent of the par-amount total of
issues with market ratings of under 1 percent, plus from 47 to 81
percent of issues with market ratings of 1 percent and over. On
the other hand, the Massachusetts legal list included only 29 to
56 percent of the volume of issues with market ratings under
1 percent plus a small proportion of issues rated low grade by the
market (a maximum of 20 percent in 1936, and a minimum of
3 percent in 1928).
The proportion of the total volume of high grades that con-
sisted of large issues ($5 million and over) gradually rose during
the period studied, as did the proportion of large issues in total
outstandings; but the gap between the proportions gradually nar-
rowed. Similar trends. are observable in the data for issues of ob-
ligors with assets of $200 million and over, although there was a
drop in the proportion of large corporations among high grades






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































first change occurred in both issues rated high grade and low
grade and despite a rise in the proportion of total outstandings
accounted for by the large obligors. The declines for rated issues
in this period were caused primarily by the large volume of pub-
lic utility bonds offered in the twenties by corporations with assets
of under $200 million. These declines were, however, more than
offset by a rise in the volume of unrated outstandings of larger
corporations, so that the proportion of total outstandings (rated
and unrated) accounted for by issues of obligors with assets of
$200 million and over rose. Between 1936 and 1944, large obligors
increased in importance in total outstandings and in issues rated
low grade by the market, but declined in importance among high
grades. Issues of many large railroads were rated down by the
market in the thirties, while many high-grade public utility bonds
of large corporations moved out of the rated class as they were
refunded into private placements.
The data clearly indicate that the market has favored issues
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and the underlying in-
dustry breakdowns (cf. Statistical Measures, Table 12) show that
the rating differentials were greatest in the utility and industrial
fields. These were precisely the groups for which the Stock Ex-
change listing requirements were most restrictive as. to quality.
In 1944, for example, the same proportion of low-grade rail bonds
(by volume) was listed on the New York Stock Exchange as of
high grades (94 percent). In the same year, however, 66 percent of
the total for high-grade utilities had Exchange listings but only
31 percent of the low grades. The corresponding figures for in-
dustrials are 91 percent and 70 percent.
Because of the poor experience record of many long-term rail
issues during the Great Depression, the average term to maturity
of outstanding issues has shortened materially in recent
and the yields have reflected the preference for the shorter ma-
turities. (Note the relatively small proportion of high grades and
the large proportion of low grades that had maturities of over
thirty years in 1944.) In most of the earlier years, there was a
slight market preference for the longer maturities, particularly
for the long-term rail and utility issues.
The market has also exhibited a preference for senior issues as
against debentures and junior mortgage liens. The market pref-
erence for senior liens was not so pronounced as that of the legal
ii Cf. Volume of Financing, Chapter 2.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 305
lists, however, although more pronounced than that of the agen-
cies (cf. Tables 29 and 41). In the industrial field the market, like
the agencies, began by about 1928 to develop a preference for the
unsecured issues (debentures), a preference that became quite pro-
nounced by 1944.
Stability of the Volume of Securities in
Different Rating Classes
The feasibility of a yield test as a means of defining a list of eligi-
ble or amortizable securities depends largely upon. the stability
of the volume meeting the test. Pronounced fluctuations in the
volume of securities meeting a given test imply either that the
test must be revised frequently (with the time-consuming nego-
tiations that usually precede such changes.) or that a large volume
of securities will continually move on and off the eligible list. In
this section the stability of the volume of securities meeting vari-
ous market-rating tests will be investigated in two ways: first, b.y
examining the distributions in different market-rating classifica-
tions at offering, cross-classified by quality at extinguishment, and
secondly, by an appraisal of similar distributions of outstandings
based on market ratings at the beginning and end of quadrennial
periods.
Table 57 presents the distributions of the par amounts of offer-
ings by several quality measures at extinguishment. Since only
16 percent by volume of all straight issues. extinguished between
1900 and 1944 was paid in full at maturity'2 and since yield to
maturity is practically meaningless when an issue is approaching
extinguishment by any other method, promised yields to maturity
calculated near the extinguishment date do not provide reliable
estimates of the market's appraisals of risk. Market ratings at
extinguishment were therefore not used in this investigation (ex-
cept in Table 59 where for obvious reasons no other system of
ratings could be employed). To obtain ro.ugh approximations of
the quality of bond issues at extinguishment for Table 57, we fell
back upon the two rating systems examined earlier; that is, the
composite agency ratings and legal status at extinguishment.
The table shows that the market's appraisal of the quality of
an issue at offering is a fairly good indicator of its probable quality
at extinguishment. The proportion of the par-amount total of
12 For distributions of par amounts extinguished, by method of extinguish-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































offerings rated I—Iv at extinguishment moves inversely, and quite
systematically, with the size of the yield spread at offering—moves
directly, that is, with the market's original estimate of quality.
The same is true within each of the major industry groups, with
the single exception of industrials with market ratings of under
½percent,where, because of the sizable volume not rated by the
agencies at extinguishment, the proportion rated i—iv was slightly
under that of offerings with market ratings. of 1/2 to 1 percent.
For other industrial issues., and for the rails and utilities of all
groups, the volume not rated by the agencies at extinguishment
was fairly small, and the proportion rated grade v or lower at
extinguishment was systematically larger the lower the quality
as judged by the market at offering. The percentages of offerings
not legal in any of the three states at extinguishment (Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, and New York), and their complements (the percent-
ages legal in one or more of those states), also moved in agree-
ment with the market's judgment at offering. The same is true
throughout the table for issues legal in only one state, in two of
the states, and in all three states at extinguishment, except for
two groups: rails with market ratings of 1 percent and over at
offering and legal in one state at extinguishment; and industrials
with market ratings of 1 to 2 percent and legal in two' states at
extinguishment. The various proportions of issues legal and not
legal at extinguishment and of issues in the different agency-rating
groups are, of course, not all independent of one another. They
may, however, be separated into several independent groups, and
it can then be shown by correlation methods that the' rankings
are statistically significarit.13 We conclude that the quality of an
issue at offering as determined by the market rating provides a
fairly reliable forecast of its quality at extinguishment.
Table 57 indicates clearly that for top-grade issues the market
was a less reliable indicator of the agency rating at extinguish-
ment for rails than for industrials or utilities. For example, of the
respective volumes of issues rated at extinguishment, 94 percent
of the utilities and 78 percent of the' industrial offerings, with mar-
ket ratings under ½percentwere rated i—iv by the agencies at
13 For example, the proportions of offerings in the different market rating
classes that were rated I—iv at extinguishment are independent for the major
industry groups. The probability of obtaining the degree of correspondence
of ranks observed in the table, or better, b.y chance (the concordance coefli-
cient w)is0.017; cf. M. G. Kendall and B. Babington Smith, Problem
of m Rankings," Annals of Mathematical Vol. x, pp. 275-87.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 309
extinguishment, while only 60 percent of the rails were so rated.
(Contrariwise, the market was a better predictor of agency rating
for low-grade rails than for low-grade utilities and industrials.)
The market was also less successful in predicting legal status at
extinguishment for rails than for utilities. Reliable comparisons
cannot be made for industrial issues since so few were eligible for
savings bank investment during the period studied.
Table 58, containing percentage distributions of par-amount
totals of issues rated high grade and low grade by the market at
the beginning of quadrennial periods, each cross-classified by mar-
ket rating at the end of the corresponding periods, throws addi-
tional light on the stability of the volume of securities in the dif-
ferent market-rating classifications. As in other tables of this type
(cf. Tables 31 and 45), issues extinguished during a given period
were excluded in order to eliminate the sporadic effects of redemp-
tions and other retirements, thus making it possible to obtain
ratings for most of the included issues at the end as well as at
the beginning of the periods.
The table shows that for issues initially rated high grade by the
market there was unusually heavy downgrading during the periods
1916—19, 1928—31, 1932—35, and 1936—39. One-third or more of
the par-amount total of issues with market ratings of under 1 per-
cent at the beginning of those periods had dropped below grade
by the end of the period. Conversely, exceptionally heavy upgrad-
ing occurred during the periods 1900—1 903, 1908—11, 1920—23, and
1924—27.
Since on the average a market rating of under 1 percent in-
cluded about half of the total volume of all rated outstandings,
a rough measure of the extent of upgrading and downgrading
within a period can be obtained from Table 58 by subtracting the
percentage of issues downgraded from the percentage upgraded
and dividing by two. In 1924, for example, the par-amount total
of rated outstandings was distributed almost evenly on either side
of the 1 percent mark (see Table 53), so that one-half the differ-
ence between the proportion of low grades rated up during 1924—
27 (38.4 percent) and the proportion of high grades rated down
(4.7 percent), gives an estimate of 16.9 percent for the net upgrad-
ing of outstandings that were rated at the beginning and end of
the period. On other quadrennial dates, the division of the total
between high and low grades was more unequal, 1932 and 1936
being the extreme examples. By taking account of such variations310 MARKET RATING
TABLE 58—Outstandings with High and Low Market Ratings
at Beginning of Four-year Periods, Distributed by Market
Rating at End; 1900—1943
MARKET RATING AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD
UNDER 1PERCENT 1PERCENTAND OVER
MARKET RATING AT END MARKET RATING AT END
Under1 Percent InformationUnder1 Percent Information
PERIOD 1 Percent and overLacking1 Percent and overLacking
1900—1903
All Issues
93.9% 3.3% 2.8% 52.0%46.7% 1.3%
1904—190781.6 15.6 2.8 18.9 75.0 6.1
1908—1911 97.7 1.7 0.6 42.7 50.4 6.9
1912—191582.4 14.4 3.2 12.3 68.8 18.9
1916—191963.5 33.8 2.7 6.3 79.0 14.7
1920—192393.9 6.0 0.1 36.8 58.6 4.6
1924—192792.4 4.7 2.9 38.4 52.1 9.5
1928—193142.0 55.3 2.7 2.5 84.7 12.8
1932—193554.8 4.3.2 2.0 8.8 69.7 21.5
1936—193938.9 57.1 4.0 0.6 86.5 12.9
1940—194395.9 2.8 1.3 8.5 88.3 3.2
Railroads
1900—190394.3 3.2 2.5 59.6 40.4 0.0
1904—190787.3 10.5 2.2 8.7 84.9 6.4
1908—1911 97.6 1.7 0.7 50.1 44.8 5.1
1912—191580.8 16.0 3.2 1.0 61.8 37.2
1916—191968.2 30.1 1.7 2.2 91.3 6.5
1920—192397.3 2.7 0.0 41.3 54.4 4.3
1924—1927 94.8 1.7 3.5 63.6 27.1 9.3
1928—1931 29.5 68.4 2.1 0.0 80.4 19.6
1932—1935 77.0 21.9 1.1 17.2 51.4 31.4
1936—193921.9 73.2 4.9 0.1 83.9 16.0
1940—194393.7 4.3 2.0 10.0 88.9 1.1
—that is, by weighting the percentages in Table 58 by the relevant
figures in the first two columns of Table 53—reliable indexes for
net upgrading of rated outstandings can be obtained. Such indexes
show heavy net downgrading in 1928—31, sizable net downgrading
in 1916—19 and 1936—39, and sizable net upgrading in 1900—1903,
1908—il, 1920—23, and 1924—27.
Changes in the quartiles of yield spreads (market ratings) in
Table 8 may be interpreted similarly, although they cover all
rated outstandings, whereas Table 58 includes fixed samples of
issues rated at the beginning and end of the indicated periods,TABLE 58
(concluded)
VOLUME AND CHARACTERiSTiCS 3fl
MARKET RATING AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD
UNDER 1 PERCENT 1 PERCENT ANDOVER
MARKET RATING AT END MARKET RATINGAT END
Under1 Percent InformationUnder1 PercentInformation
PERIOD1 Percent and overLacking1 Percent and overLacking
Public Utilities
1900—190391.2%4.4% 4.4% 36.1%58.3% 5.6%
1904—190741.7 51.0 7.3 5.9 81.4 12.7
1908—1911 96.3 3.7 0.0 36.8 59.2 4.0
1912—191581.7 13.0 5.3 15.1 75.0 9.9
1916—191920.2 71.6 82 3.2 72.3 24.5
1920—192381.8 18.2 0.0 34.9 60.3 4.8
1924—1927 88.4 10.9 0.7 30,3 59.6 10.1
1928—1931 62.4 34.0 3.6 4.! 86.0 9.9
1932—193539.5 57.8 2.7 0.9 91.6 7.5
1936—193978.1 20.5 1.4 1.2 89.1 9.7
1940—194396.7 2.2 1.1 6.2 87.5 6.3
Industrials
1900—190348.5 0.0 51.5 37.8 62.2 0.0
1904—190787.3 12.7 0.0 44.0 56.0 0.0
1908—1911100.0 0.0 0.0 37.8 44.8 17.4
1912—191597.7 2.3 0.0 28.7 65.3 6.0
1916—191994.9 3.8 1.3 31.9 64.5 3.6
1920—192384.6 14.8 0.6 20.9 73.2 5.9
1924—192784.5 12.2 3.3 11.6 79.9 8.5
1928—1931 60.2 36.5 3.3 1.6 85.! 13.3
1932—193532.7 64.1 3.2 2.7 71.6 25.7
1936—193924.6 67.2 8.2 0.0 84.4 15.6
1940—194394.2 4.2 1.6 3.9 87.4 8.7
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of
small issues adjusted quadrennially to universe totals, with issues extinguished
during each period excluded.
i.e. rated outstandings exclusive of offerings of new issues and cx-
tinguishments of old. In general the results correspond closely, in
the sense that net upgrading of the fixed samples occurred when
the yield spreads narrowed, and net downgrading when the yield
spreads widened. The only exception. is 1932—35, when the index
constructed from Table 58 shows slight net downgrading, while
yield spreads for total rated outstandings narrowed considerably.
That was one of the two discrepancies noted in the discussion of312 MARKET RATING
Table 53. In 1932—35 the yield spreads for total rated outstandings
were reduced by a large volume of high-grade public utility offer-
ings and by the default of man)' low-grade issues, which thereupon
moved out of the class of rated outstandings.
As measured by the index of net upgrading the rails and utili-
ties behaved similarly over the various four-year periods, and
they dominated the totals for all issues. Generally speaking, the
industrials behaved atypically. Through 1924—27 they were rated
up consistently by the market, and then, after a period of heavy
defaults in the mid-twenties, were consistently rated down.14
Within the major industry groups generally, the proportion of
outstandings of high grades rated down by the market (i.e. gross
downgrading) usually moved in sympathy with the default record
of the industry, although it sometimes led and sometimes lagged
behind actual defaults. Rails were rated down in large volume by
the market during the period 1916—19, after particularly heavy
defaults in 1913—16. Downgrading was unusually heavy in the
utility group in 19 16—19, and also in the industrial group in 1920—
23, the downgrading corresponding to exceptionally heavy de-
faults on utilities in l918—20 and on industrials in 1924. Moreover,
the general downgrading of corporate issues in all groups in the
thirties reflects the widespread defaults of that period. A similar
sensitivity of composite agency ratings to impending defaults was
noted in Chapter 3 (see the section on stability of ratings).
Some evidence as to the relative stability of the different quality
measures is gained by comparing the percentages of outstandings
with market ratings under 1 percent at the beginning of the
periods that were still rated under I percent at the end with com-
parable figures based on issues rated I—Tv by the agencies (Table
31). For all issues combined, the proportion remaining high grade
throughout a period, when measured by market ratings, was almost
always below the corresponding proportion as measured by agency
ratings, and well below it in 1916—19 and 1928—39, indicating that
the market was less stable than the agency ratings (or more sensi-
tive to changing conditions, depending upon one's point of view).15
The period 1920—23 was exceptional in that the proportion of the
14 For annal data on the volume of corporate bond defaults, see Volume
of Financing, Chapter 5 and Table A-17.
15 Itis perhaps unnecessary to note that the term is used here
in a formal statistical sense; and it is not our intention to imply that a stable
measure is necessarily more desirable, in and of itself, than a less stable (or
more sensitive) measure. From the standpoint of administration, a stable meas-VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 313
amount outstanding with market ratings under 1 percent at the
beginning of the period that was still so rated at the end of the pe-
riod was slightly above the proportion for the agency ratings (94
percent versus 93 percent). The explanation is that the bond mar-
ket was disorganized in 1920, so that only one-third of the aggre-
gate volume of outstandings had a market rating of under 1 per-
cent. The market had largely recovered by 1924 and most of the
initial group of top-grade issues still had market ratings of under 1
percent. In addition, because of the broad market recovery 37 per-
cent of the amount of outstandings that the market rated low in
1920 (yield spread, 1 percent or over) was rated high grade in
1924, as compared with only 32 percent rated up by the agencies.
In several other periods as well, the low-grade sector of the mar-
ket, as defined by the market rating, was less stable than the sector
defined by the composite agency rating, suggesting that there was
usually more upgrading and downgrading by the market. A simi-
lar conclusion may be drawn from a comparison of Table 45 for
the legal lists with Table 58 for the market ratings. While less
stable than a list selected by means of agency ratings, the legal
lists appear usually to have been more stable than a list selected on
the basis of the market rating. It should be noted, however, that
the proportions shown in the various tables, although suggestive,
are not strictly comparable since they are based on different
amounts of outstanding issues. Further analysis, by means of
equally inclusive lists of securities selected under the different
rating systems, is reserved for the next chapter.
Market Ratings and Business Cycles
To investigate the short-run ups and downs in the volume of
bonds rated high grade (market rating under 1 percent) and low
grade (market rating 1 percent and over), annual series for out-
standings were constructed along the lines described in the chap-
ters on agency ratings and legal lists.16 The annual net changes
ure is, of course, more desirable since its use avoids the necessity for purchase
and sale as securities meet or fail to meet a given quality test. Similarly, a
stable measure is desirable if it fits a given investment situation for a longer
period of time than a less stable measure. But a stable measure is undesirable,
if it fails to reflect fundamental changes in investment worth. The evidence
of the next chapter permits us to conclude that the advantage lies with the
agency ratings from the standpoint of administrative ease; but the agency
ratings were less sensitive to short-run default risks than the market ratings.
16Interpolatingseries based on special tabulations of data in the Annual314 MARKET RATING
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Universe estimates for straight bonds, yearly totals in par amount, from "Staflsflcal
Measures," Table 12.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and White areas,
representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's "Meas-
uring Business Cycles" (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 78.
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in outstandings are plotted in Chart 18 against the business cycle
as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The
chart shows a pronounced inverse relationship between the high
and low grades as rated by the market, but little correspondence
between the timing of either series and business activity. In the
preceding chapters also, no consistent correspondence in timing
was found between business cycles and the net change series for
issues on the New York and Massachusetts legal lists. Maine legals
and the top agency rating grades, on the other hand, responded
directly and systematically to the general business cycle (cf. Charts
8 and 13).
Since the principal characteristics of high-grade issues, whether
designated by the agencies, the legal lists, or the market, have
been found to be roughly similar, the divergent behavior of the
series with respect to the business cycle calls for further study.
For this purpose, s.pecial annual series on offerings, extinguish-
ments, net upgrading, etc. were derived, comparable to those pre-
sented in earlier chapters.17
Conformity indexes for the various derived series are given in
Table 59. Comparison with the corresponding indexes in Tables
32 and 46 reveals that all five of the high-grade offerings series—
those covering market ratings under 1percent, agency ratings
i—iv, and Maine, Massachusetts, and New York legals—reflect the
negative conformity of total bond offerings. Similarly, the various
final extinguishment series for high grades reflect the low positive
conformity of total final extinguishments.18 While the conformity
indexes for high-grade final extinguishments as defined by the
market rating differ widely among industry groups, and with the
Record of the original Corporate Bond Project were used for issues in good
standing. Although outstanding issues in default are included in our other
series, they were disregarded when constructing the series for market ratings,
since promised yields to maturity have no meaning for bonds in default. For
the derived series, see Stat istical Measures, Table 12.
17Theoriginal records of the Corporate Bond Project provide data on the
market rating at offering but not at extinguishment. The latter series were
estimated on the basis of market ratings on the last date that an issue
peared in the Annual or Periodic Records. Issues in default at extinguish.
ment were treated as not rated from date of default to extinguishment. Be-
cause of possible errors in timing of the market rating at extinguishment
and the difliculty of interpreting the rating at that time, the extinguishment
series are more than usually liable to error.
18Conformityindexes for total offerings of straight corporate bonds, as given
in Volume of Financing, Table 4, are +20, —80, —68; for total final extin-
guishments they are +20,andVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 317
TABLE 39—Conformity Indexes for Bonds with High
Low Market Ratings: Offerings, Extinguishments,
Changes, and Net Upgrading, 1900—1938
UNDER 1 PERCENT 1 PERCENT ANDOVER
Expan-Cont rac-FullExpan-Cong rac-Full
sion lion Cycle sion Lion Cycle
Based on annual par-amount data for straight corporate bonds from Tables
12 and 70 of Measures, and special supplementary tabulations for
final extinguishment data. All series cover ten cycles. These indexes do not
take account of possible leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points.
indexes based on the other systems of rating, not too much im-
portance should be attached to the discrepancies, since the extin-
guishment series for the market rating are susceptible to sizable
errors (cf. footnote 17).
The two variants of net upgrading (Chart 19) agree less well
with one another than the corresponding pairs of variants based
on agency ratings (Chart 9); yet their directions of change from
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CHART19—Net Upgrading of Outstanding Issues by the Securi-
ties Market, 1900-1943
Universe estimatesfor straight bonds from "Statistical Measures," Tables 12 and
70, and from special supplementary tabulations.
Net upgrading is that part of the annual net change in the par-amount total of
bond outstandings rated high (yield spread, under1 percent) or low (yield spread,
1 percent and over) that is attributable to revisions of market ratings of outstanding
issues.Positive values indicate an excess of upward over downward reviSions;
negative values, an excess of downward over upward revisions. VariantIwas
computed from changes in high grades and Variant II from changes in low grades.
If yield informafion were available throughout the lives of all issues, including partial
extinguishments, the two series would be identical.
Shaded areas, representing contractions ingeneral business activity, and white
areas, representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's
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preceding chapters that Variant i measures the net change in the
amount of high-grade outstandings after removal of the effects
of new offerings and final extingu.ishments, and that Variant II
measures the corresponding net change for low grades, taken with
sign reversed. E.xcept for the effects of partial extinguishments
(for which ratings. are not available), the two variants would be
identical if all issues were rated throughout their lives; but by
the same token, the absence of ratings (in this case of market
quotations needed to compute the ratings) may be a source of
serious error. For example, when quotations are available at the
beginning of a year but not at the end, an issue is considered
as downgraded under Variant i or upgraded under Variant H, de-
pending upon whether it was high grade or low grade at the
beginning of the year in question. Since issues were deliberately
not rated during the period in which they were in default, it was
necessary to remove such issues from Variant ii in the year of de-
fault to prevent spurious upgrading; but other adjustments could
not be effected. A glance at the chart will show that in many years
Variant ii was above Variant i, but the relationship was not so
consistent as for agency ratings. Part of the explanation is the
absence of information on partial extinguishments, which reduces
Variant i and increases Variant ii (d. page 169). Also, the absence
of information at the end of certain years, caused by heavy calls
in the periods from which the quotations were taken (i.e. the first
quarter of the following year) had the same effect, since the in-
cidence of call is higher for high grades than low grades. Apart
from these systematic differences, Variant i is believed to be more
erratic than Variant ii because of the gradual disappearance of
high-grade issues into the vaults and strongboxes of permanent
investors. As the market becomes thinner, and quotations are
given less regularly, Variant i may show sporadic downgrading in
some years and upgrading in others.
In any event, it is evident from the conformity indexes and the
charts that the net upgrading series are dominated by the net
changes in total outstandings, which provides confidence in the
general results since the net changes are believed to be relatively
free of error. More important for present purposes, the net up-
grading series, like the net changes, show little conformity to busi-
ness cycles. In this respect, the market ratings behaved like the
New York and Massachusetts legal lists, which were also not
closely geared to the business cycle. They are thus in sharp con-VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 321
trast with the agency ratings, which were highly sensitive to the
ups and clowns of the cycle.'9
Additional evidence to the same effect may be obtained from
Chart 19 by counting the number of times that the two variants
for net upgrading moved upward and downward over successive
phases of the business cycle. The chart indicates that Variant I
rose in five business expansions and declined in the other five and
that it rose in three business contractions and declined in the
other seven. Similarly, Variant ii rose in four business expansions
and declined in six; and rose in six business contractions and de-
clined in four. The general pattern throughout the full period
studied was therefore one of negligible conformity to business
cycles, although there is some evidence that the conformity may
have improved in later years.2°
The absence of clear-cut conformity of net upgrading by the
market appears surprising, since it might be assumed a priori
that the market rating, considered as a risk premium, would nar-
row when business is buoyant and widen when business is de-
pressed. A possible explanation may be the pull on the yield
spreads of the basic yields on high-grade bonds in certain periods.
As we have seen, the proportion of outstanding issues rated high
grade under the market rating was inversely related to, the basic
yields on high-grade bonds. This results from the fact that the
yield spreads themselves were directly related to the basic yields.
Comparison of the yields on high- and low-grade bond issues
gests further that the yield spreads usually lagged behind the
basic yields (that is,yields of low-grade issues usually turned
19Theconformity indexes of Table 59 were constucted on the assumption
that the timing of the series was roughly coincident with that of the general
business cycle. Detailed analysis of the annua.l data reveals little in the way of
a systematic pattern of timing, either of this or of any other type. For example,
itis difficult to decide whether the typical expansion period for high-grade
bond offerings runs from reference peak to trough (stages v—Ix) or from
peak to mid-expansion (stages v—itt), and whether the typical expansion period
for high-grade final extinguishments runs from trough to peak (stages I—v)
or from trough to mid-expansion (stages i—Ill). The typical expansion period
for total offerings is from stages v to iii and for total extinguishments from
stages xto ni (Volume of Financing, p. 69 n). Computed on these bases, the
conformity indexes for high-grade offerings, all industries, are —60, —60, —68,
and for high-grade final extinguishments, + 100, +68, negligible im-
provements in both cases. The net upgrading series show no evidence of
systematic timing.
20 For example. in the three cycles covered by the Maine legal list, the con-
formity of net upgrading by the market (Variants i and ii) on a vu to in basis
was +100, +100, +100. Maine legals conformed similarly.822 MARKET RATING
downward after yields on high grades had begun to fall; and con-
versely). Since the basic yields on high grades frequently rose dur-
ing the early stages of most business expansions (particularly dur-
ing the early part of the period studied), the tendency for the
yield spreads to widen as basic yields rose may have neutralized
the opposite tendency for the yield spreads (considered as risk pre-
miums) to narrow as business improved. Conversely, since basic
yields usually moved downward during the early stages of most
business contractions, the tendency for yield spreads to narrow at
that time may have offset the opposite tendency for risk premiums
to widen as business deteriorated. But whatever the explanation,
it is clear that the pull of the various factors operating on the yield
spreads was sufficiently strong during the full period investigated
to neutralize the effects of the business cycle. It follows that a list
constructed on the basis of the market rating was less sensitive
to the ups and downs of business activity than a list constructed
on the basis of agency ratings. On the other hand, as has been
noted earlier, the market was more sensitive to the optimistic fer-
vor of the late 1920's than the investment agencies; and the market
was extremely depressed by the sharp recession of the early
thirties. Whether the same responses would be observed in mar-
ket appraisals of quality measured in some other way (e.g. by
means of ratios rather than simple yield differentials) remains an
open question.
INVESTOR EXPERIENCE AND MARKET RATINGS
In preceding chapters it has been suggested that the principal aim
of the compilers of the legal lists and the investment agencies is
to distribute bond issues among classes in order of the relative
risk of default and the magnitude of possible default loss. The
difference between two given issues, one rated Aaa (and eligible
for savings bank investment) and the other rated Caa (and ineligi-
ble for such investment), is simply that the risk of default of the
former is judged to be less than that of the latter. It is not the
intent of the agencies and compilers of the legal lists to suggest
that the issues judged higher in quality are in any sense better
"buys" than the lower grades. That would depend upon the par-
ticular circumstances in each case—the market price of the issue,
trends in capital values, the stage of the business cycle, the re-
quirements of the investor, the size of his portfolio, etc.
Loosely speaking, the market, too, is engaged in the process ofiNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 323
ranking issues in order of their relative risk of default. Other
things being equal, the greater the prospective risk of default (or
more precisely, the greater the discounted value of the expected
default loss), the greater will be the risk premium in promised
yield, i.e. the greater the yield spread or market rating. Unlike the
investment agencies and the legal lists, the market is therefore
not concerned solely with the ranking of issues according to de-
fault risk, but with the adequacy of the risk premium as well.
According to Marshall's theory of investment values, a properly
priced security (one selling at its long-run equilibrium price)
would sell to yield the basic return on riskiess investments having
the same term to maturity, plus a risk premium just adequate,
when combined with a large number of other securities, to off-
set the expected loss. In our terminology, if market appraisals were
correct in that sense, the average realized yield on a group of
issues held over a given period would equal the basic rate on high-
grade issues maturing at the end of the period, and the average
market rating would equal the average loss rate, or percentage
of book value required to be set aside annually out of income
to offset the capital loss.
Modern theories of investment values go somewhat beyond
Marshall's statement by suggesting that the market exacts a com-
plex premium for risk depending upon various parameters of the
distribution of prospective yields, such as the mean or expected
value of the distribution, the variance, the skewness, etc.2' Re-
duced to their essentials, such theories imply that the promised
yield contains three major components: (1) the basic yield on
riskless investments, (2) a premium to cover the "expected" default
loss, and (3) a premium for "risk bearing" or degree of clustering
of the distribution of prospective yields about the expected value.
Whether such theories are applicable to corporate bonds at the
present time may be questioned, since they appear to be based on
the assumption that the market is comprised largely of small in-
vestors, an assumption inappropriate for corporate bonds, which
have been held principally by large investment institutions, at
least since the 1920's. Nevertheless, institutional investors, like
individuals, are embarrassed by the mere act of default (even
21. See, for example, A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London, 1920),
Appendix i (particularly pp. 97 if.); F. Lavington, The English Capital Market
(London, 1921), Chapter iv; H. Makower and J. Marschak, "Assets, Prices and
Monetary Theory," Economica, New Series, Vol. v, No. 19 (1938), pp. 271-74;
J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital (Oxford, 1939), pp. 142 f.324 MARKET RATING
though they may technically be able to withstand it), since under
present legal arrangements they must either liquidate their hold-
ings at that time or write them down to the market price (absorb
a capital loss) irrespective of prospects as to the ultimate outcome
of the investment. Given two securities with equal expected rates
of return, most institutional investors prefer the one with the
lower default risk, and exact a premium for risk bearing on the
other (or refuse to purchase it at any yield), much as is implied
by modern versions of classical investment theory. Present in-
stitutional arrangements therefore suggest the possibility that the
returns actually realized on groups of investments may rise with
(be an increasing function of) the size of the yield spread; that is,
may vary inversely with quality as judged by the market. It is with
the purpose of testing such notions that we turn to an examina-
tion of default risks and default losses on corporate bonds in dif-
ferent market-rating classifications, and to a comparison of the
over-all rates of return obtained on the different groups of in-
vestments.
Default Rates
The default record of corporate bonds in selected market-rating
classifications is presented in Tables 60—62, the first table con-
taining percentages of the par amounts of offerings that subse-
quently went into default, and the latter two, proportions of the
volume of outstanding issues at the beginning of quadrennial and
longer periods that went into default before the end of the pe-
riods. Table 61 on quadrennial outstandings includes pooled
sample data adjusted to represent all straight corporate bond out-
standings; the other two tables present only the unadjusted data
for issues in the large and small issues experience samples.
Like the investment agencies and the legal lists, the market has
exhibited a remarkable ability to rank issues in order of the risk
of future default. This is particularly true of the short chronologi-
cal periods but remains true of the life-span periods from offering
to extinguishment. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, default rates
for bond offerings, calculated on the basis of the proportion of
offerings that later defaulted, are influenced by the period of
offering and of extinguishment, and by many other factors inde-
pendent of the intrinsic quality of an issue at offering. Despite
these disturbances, Table 60 reveals that the percentage of the par
amount of the large issues that subsequently went into defaultINVESTOR EXPERIENCE 325
TABLE 60—Proportionsof Offerings1900—1943inGiven




RatingUnder 3/2—1 1—2 2Percent




Railroads 28.1 22.8 28.2 29.3 54.3
Publicutilities 10.6 1.1 6.2 18.8 24.3
Street railways64.3 38.7 75.0 70.1 40.2
Allothers 6.3 0.8 2.9 11.4 20.7
Industrials 14.8 3.0 4.1 15.9 31.7
Small issues, all
industries 24.9 13.1 10.6 27.8 28.2
Railroads 20.6 16.1 6.6 31.7 20.0
Public utilities 20.9 1.9 13.4 26.6 16.7
Street railways 67.1 0.0° 52.2 77.1 72.2
All others 13.2 2.4 0,0 16.5 14.1
Industrials 33.7 0.0° 27.6 39.5
Par Amount of Offerings, Defaults and Nondefaults
(millions)
Large issues, all
industries $52,438.4 $12,172.3 $16,817.3 $18,312.0$5,136.8
Railroads 16,979.45,144.46,150.54,905.6 778.9
Public utilities 22,897.25,769.37,552.37,686.61,889.0




industries 932.1 70.2 106.1 446.3 309.5
Railroads 180.6 55.1 39.2 73.3 13.0
Public utilities 459.1 15.1 64.6 237.5 141.9
Streetrailways 65.4 2.7 16.6 39.9 6.2
All others 393.7 12.4 48.0 197.6 135.7
Industrials 292.4 0.0 2.3 135.5 154.6
Based on Tables 191 and 192 of Statistical Measures, and special supple-
mentary tabulations, covering regular offerings in the offerings experience
sample.
°Basedon less than five offerings.326 MARKET RATiNG
varied consistently and inversely with the market's estimate of
the quality of the offerings. The record of small issues is not so
impressive in this respect as that of large issues. Yet for each of
the eight industry-size groups presented in the table, it is clear
that the default rates for offerings rated high by the market were
rather consistently below the corresponding rates for offerings
rated low. In particular, the default rates for top grade issues,
those with market ratings of under ½percent,were uniformly be-
low the default rates of issues with market ratings of 1 to 2 per-
cent or 2 percent and over.
Within the industry-size groups, the only notable evidence of
market inaccuracy in ranking is for the very low-grade issues
(market ratings of 2 percent and over). The table indicates that
the market was least successful in forecasting the default experi-
ence of the large street railways and small railroads. Reference
back to Tableshows that the investment agencies also under-
rated the low-grade street railways but ranked the rails correctly.
Although the general ordering of the market's appraisals of de-
fault risk at offering appears to have been reasonably good within
industry groups, between industries the market committed essenti-
ally the same errors as the agencies and compilers, of the legal lists.
Like the other rating systems the market overrated the rails and
street railways at offering, and underrated other utilities and in-
dustrials.
The market's short-run appraisals of default risk, based on rat-
ings assigned to outstanding issues at the beginning of the quad-
rennial periods, were also quite accurate (Table 61). For all ex-
cept three of the sixty-six comparisons that can be made from the
data in the table, the default rate was more favorable for issues
with market ratings under 1 percent than for issues rated as of
lower quality, and the exceptions are really borderline cases. In
the period 1904—07 the only default suffered by the small issues
was an extension at maturity of a single high-grade issue guaran-
teed by a large street railway system. (The extension was treated
as a default in our records, since the issue sold below par on the
date of extension.) Although information is scanty, it seems likely
that the system could have refunded the small issue in a more
orthodox fashion, since no other issue of the system was in default
at the time. In the period 1908—11 no small issue went into default,
and in the period 1924—27 a single large issue was responsible for




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a joint obligation of the Reading Company and the Philadelphia
and Reading Coal and Iron Company, wasexchangedfor new
securities in a segregation of railroad and coal properties follow-
ing an antitrust suit. Since the successor securities sold below par
at date of exchange, the situation was treated as a default, although
the annual loss rate on the successors, calculated from offering to
five years after the exchange, was negative, indicating that their
prices subsequently recovered. It should also be noted that among
the high grades generally the quadrennial default rates reveal little
bias in favor of any particular size or industrial group. It would
seem from this evidence that the market ultimately corrected for
its underestimation at offering of the risks of default on rail
bonds. On the other hand, the market frequently erred as be-
tween industries, since in most periods the industry having the
highest default rate for the high grades also had the highest de-
fault rate for the low grades. Although there is little evidence of
systematic favoritism over the short periods, the market frequently
had more difficulty in ranking issues between industries than
within industries.
We have seen that the investment agencies, like the market,
made excellent short-run forecasts of default incidence. From ma-
terials so far presented, a list comprised of issues meeting a yield
test of 1 percent over the basic rate appears generally to have been
of higher quality, from the standpoint of default risk, than one in-
cluding issues in the first four agency rating grades. Thus, in the
forty-eight possible comparisons of the data in Tables. 61 and 35,
the default rate of issues with market ratings under 1 percent was
below the corresponding rate for issues in the first four rating
grades in forty-one cases, was. above in only four cases, and the
two were tied in three cases. On the other hand, the volume of
the issues in the under 1 percent class was usually less than that of
issues rated i—iv (and in the 1 percent and over class exceeded
the v—Ix's), so that default rat.es on the low grades under the
market-rating test were also usually below those on issues rated
v—ix by the agencies. It is therefore not possible to decide on the
basis of such information which of the two quality measures was
the more sensitive to the risk of default. In the next chapter an
attempt will be made to determine whether the agencies or the
market was more discriminating as to short-run default risk by
comparing equally inclusive lists of securities.
The default rates for longer chronological periods, reduced to aINVESTOR EXPERiENCE 329
quadrennial basis, are presented in Table 62.22Here,as in other
tables of this type, the ratings were assigned to outstanding issues
at the beginning of the indicated periods, on the basis of the rat-
ings then prevailing. Like those for the four-year periods, they re-
veal the skill of the market in differentiating default incidence
TABLE 62—Long-periodDefaultRatesAdjustedtoa
Quadrennial Basis for Outstandings with High and Low




Market Rating of under 1 Percent
1900—1907 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1900—1919 1.3 1.2 2.3 0.0
1908—1913 2.2 2.5 0.0 0.0
1920—1927 0.9 0.0 0.0 5.3
1920—1931 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1920—1939 1.9 2.4 0.0 0.0
1924—1939 1.7 2.4 0.4 0.0
1928—1939 4.7 8.0 0.2 0.2
1932—1939 0.4 1.1 0.0 0.0
1900—1907
Market Rating of 1 Percent and over
0.6 0.9 0.0 0,0
1900—1919 2.6 2.6 3.7 0.0
1908—1915 6.7 9.3 3.7 6.6
1920—1927 3.5 5.4 0.6 4.7
1920—1931 2.7 4.2 0.8 1.5
1920—1939 7.3 9.9 4.5 3.5
1924—1939 7.7 15.6 4.0 2.9
1928—1939 9.4 20.6 5.8 8.0
1932—1939 13.5 20.5 6.0 10.2
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for large issues in the periodic experience sample. Default
rates are reduced to a quadrennial basis; e.g., one-half the default rate for
1920—27 was entered for that period.
prospectively within industries. (The record is marred only by the
default rate for high-grade industrials, 1920—27, which resulted
from the antitrust case mentioned previously; if it had not been
for that one issue, the default rate would have been zero for the
22Adjustmentof the long-period default rates to a quadrennialbasis was
effected by dividing by one-quarter of the number of years in the period. The
adjustment in effect assumes that, other things being equal, the volume of
defaults during a given period is proportional to the duration of exposure
to default risk.330 MARKET RATING
period.) In two important respects, however, the default rates for
the longer periods differ markedly from those of the four-year pe-
riods. First, the early market preference for rail bonds, which ex-
isted through the early thirties, is revealed by the higher default
rates on the top-grade issues in that group during the Great De-
pression than for the other major industries. Secondly, the default
rates on large high grades over the longer periods are rather sys-
tematically above the corresponding averages of the four-year rates
spanning identical periods. The two types of rates (that is, the
long-period rate and the average of the four-year rates for the
same periods) are not strictly comparable, since issues offered
after the beginning of any long period, or maturing within that
period, are excluded from the long-period calculations but may be
included in one or more of the four-year periods.23 Nevertheless,
they suggest that the accuracy of the market's forecasts worsened
as the period, of forecast lengthened, a suggestion that is confirmed
by the default rates of Table 60 covering the entire life span from
offering to extinguishment.
We conclude that the market ratings, like the legal lists and the
ratings assigned by the agencies, were good short-run indicators
of the probable incidence of default, but that they deteriorated for
longer periods. Like the other rating systems also, the market as-
signed higher ratings to the rails at offering and at the beginning
of several of the longer chronological periods than were war-
ranted by their subsequent default experience; but this bias may
have disappeared in time, since it is less evident in the data for
the four-year periods.
Default Losses
Statistics pertaining to default losses on corporate bonds in se-
lected market-rating classifications are presented in Tables 63 and
64. Like the corresponding figures based on agency ratings and
legal status (cf. Tables 37, 88, 49, and 50), the data are unweighted
price and yield averages, and cover only defaulted issues.
23Afurther diffculty arises from the procedure followed in selecting the
samples. The large-issue default rates of Table 61 include all rated issues out-
standing at the beginning of the respective four-year periods, provided only
that they met the size test for inclusion in the large issues sample; those of
Table 62 include only such of those issues as were in the periodic experience
sample. The latter excludes issues maturing within the respective periods.
It follows that the long-period rates are biased downward as compared with







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Because of the difficultyinterpreting promised yields to ma-
turity for issues approaching default, Table 63 was constructed
on the basis of current yields five years and one year before de-
fault (cf. pages 287 f.). Although the use of the current yield as a
market rating is open to the objection that no allowance is made
for changes in basic interest rates, an examination of the data
indicates that it is not without value as a predictor of capital
losses and payouts on defaulted bonds. Generally speaking, the
lower the current yield five years and one year before default, the
higher was the market price at default and the smaller the capital
loss (the difference between par and market values). Generally
speaking also, the value of future receipts discounted at 3 percent
and at 6 percent improved rather regularly with the market's
appraisal of quality prior to default. (Note, however, issues with
current yields of 8 percent and over.) On the other hand, the
average realized yields on defaulted issues calculated from de-
fault to extinguishment were higher for low grades than for high
grades, providing additional evidence that the market generally
undervalued low-grade issues at date of default. Comparison of
the price and yield averages for the large defaulted issues rated
five years and one year before default indicates that the market's
forecasts were less accurate the farther in advance the prediction
was made. The market's forecasts appear, also, to have been more
erratic in this respect than those made by the investment agencies
(cf. Table 37).
Additional evidence on the long-range forecasting ability of the
market is available in the average realized yields and loss rates on
defaulted issues calculated for the periods from offering to de-
fault and to extinguishment (Table 64). The market ratings of
this table are yield differentials assigned at offering. For both large
and small defaulted issues, the average realized yields from offer-
ing to default were generally lower for bonds whose yield spreads
at offering were wide. As was true of the agencies, the principal
reason for this phenomenon was the remarkable success of the
market in predicting default risk over short periods, with the re-
suit that high grades were outstanding, on the average, over muth
longer intervals before default than low grades.24 Since wider yield
spreads reflect higher promised yields, the loss rates from offer-
24 For the market rating grades shown in Table 64, the respective average
numbers of years that issues were outstanding before default were, for large
issues, 19, 17, 12, and 8; and, for small issues, 25, 27, 12, and 7.iNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 333
TABLE 64—Yields and Loss Rates up to Default and over Life
Span of Issues Defaulting 1900—1943 Classified by Market
Rating at Offering


















47 4.1 —0.7 4.8 2.3 1.8
Yz—1 100 4.6 —2.6 7.2 1.6 3.0
1—2 254 5.5 —4.9 10.4 1.7 3.8
2andover 148 9.7 —2.5 12.2 3.7 6.0
Small Issues
All small issues 119 7.8 —4.0 11.8 2.4 5.4
Market rating
Under'/2% 2 4.1 3.1 1.0 3.6 0.5
3/2—1 5 4.2 3.7 0.5 3.8 0.4
1—2 57 5.6 —3.3 8.9 1.5 4.1
2and over 55 10.5 —5,7 16.2 3.2 7.3
From Table 221 of Statistical Measures, covering issues in the default
experience sample. Yields and loss rates are unweighted averages. For issues
stilt outstanding on January1944 liquidation is assumed at prices prevailing
in the first quarter of that year.
ing to default were also worse for the lower-grade issues. The prin-
cipal exception to this pattern is the average realized yield on
large defaulted issues with market ratings of 2 percent and
over, which was above that of issues with market ratings of 1 to 2
percent. A similar situation was noted for the large defaulted is-
sues that were assigned low grades by the agencies at offering (cf.
Table 38). In both cases, the explanation is largely the under-
valuation of contract modifications or issues offered in exchange
for defaulted issues during the corporate reorganizations of the
thirties. Even though these issues (or rather, such of them as are
included in Table 64) later went into default, the initial market
prices were so low that extremely attractive returns were obtained
from offering to default. These returns were sufficient to offset in
part the negative returns obtained on some of the
offerings of other periods.
The loss rates on defaulted bonds held from offering to ex-MARKET RATiNG
tinguishment, like the rates from offering to default, were sys-
tematically higher the lower the quality as judged by the market.
On the other hand, the realized yields from offering to extinguish-
ment exhibit no systematic relationship to the market ratings at
offering (as was true of agency ratings). It would seem, therefore,
that for defaulted issues the risk premiums in the yields promised
at offering were roughly sufficient to equalize the returns actually
obtained on the investments in the different quality classes. It
remains to examine what the relationship is between yields to
extinguishment and market ratings when nondefaulted bonds
are added to those that went into default.
Average Life-span Yields and Loss Rates
(nondefaulted and defaulted issues combined)
Life-span yields and loss rates on nondefaulted issues in selected
market-rating grades are presented in Table 65, and comparable
data on all issues, in Table 66. The data are weighted averages
from the offerings experience sample, and cover total offerings,
regular offerings, and regular offerings since 1920.
It will be observed from Table 65 that the promised yields rose
as the market rating worsened (as would be expected, since the
yield spread is a positive component of the promised yield). On
nondefaulted bonds realized yields equal promised yields for
issues extinguished by payment in full at maturity, exceed prom-
ised yields for other types of extinguishments, and fall short of
them only for issues still outstanding and selling below book
value on the terminal date of the study (January 1, 1944). Since
the latter were unimportant, the realized yields on nondefaults
rose as quality declined. The most significant point is that the
realized yields rose more rapidly than promised yields, so that
capital gains on nondefaults rose as the yield spreads widened.
The yields and loss rates of Table 66, where defaulted and non-
defaulted issues are combined, may be interpreted as weighted
averages of the respective averages for defaulted and nondefaulted
issues. More specifically, the yield in any given cell of the table is
equivalent to the product of the default rate for that cell (from
Table 60) and the corresponding yield average for defaulted issues
(from Table 64) plus the product of the complement of that de-
fault rate and the yield average for nondefaulted issues (from
Table 65).25
Notquite, since the yields on defaulted issues from Table 64 are tin-
weighted averages, andcoveronly first offerings. Discrepancies introduced by
interpreting them as weighted yields for total defaults a.re, however, minor.iNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 335
TABLE 65—Life-span Yields and Loss Rates for Nondefaulted
Bonds Classified by Market Rating at Offering: Regular

















Large issues 5.3% 3.7% 4.5% 5.4%10.0%
Small issues 6.4 3.9 4.6 5. 7 8.4
Regular Offerings
Largeissues 4.8 3.7 4.4 5.4 7.1
Smallissues 5.7 3.9 4.6 5.7 6.8
Regular Offerings
since 1920
Largeissues 4.8 3.7 4.5 5.5 7.3
Small issues 6.1 4.3 4.9 5.9 6.9
Realized Yield
Total Offerings
Largeissues 6.1 4.2 5.2 6.5 11.4
Small issues 7.6 4.0 4.8 6.3 10.9
Regular Offerings
Largeissues 5.6 4.2 5.2 6.5 8.4
Smallissues 6.7 4.0 4.8 6.3 8.7
Regular Offerings
since 1920
Largeissues 5.8 4.3 5.5 6.8 9.1
Smallissues 7.5 4.9 5.3 6.7 9.4
Loss Rate
Total Offerings
Largeissues —0.8 —0.5 —0.7 —1.1 —1.4
Smallissues —1.2 —0.1 —0.2 —0.6 —2.5
Regular Offerings
Largeissues —0.8 —0.5 —0.8 —1.1 —1.3
Smallissues —1.0 —0.1 —0.2 —0.6 —1.9
Regular Offerings
since 1920
Largeissues —1.0 —0.6 —1.0 —1.3 —1.8
Small issues —1.4 —0.6 —0.4 —0.8 —2.5
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
covering issues in the offerings experience sample. Yields and loss rates are
weighted averages with par amounts of included offerings as weights. For
issues still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at prices
prevailing in the first quarter of that year.336 MARKET RATING
Table 66 shows that the realized yields on nondefaults rose
sufficiently rapidly as yield spreads widened to more than offset
the drag of the lower yields on the defaulted issues. The progres-
sion is quite regular, the only exception occurring in regular offer-
ings of small issues since 1920. Although the ½to1 percent class
included no defaulted issues, the following class included forty-
two, which was sufficient to counteract the higher yield obtained
on the nondefaulted issues. Otherwise, the weighted average real-
ized yields were consistently higher the poorer the market-rating
grade, indicating that the market usually undervalued the lower-
grade issues at offering. A similar conclusion was reached in chap-
ters 3 and 4 on the basis of legal status and the ratings assigned
by the agencies at offering.
It is worth noting that purchasers of the large issues. "beat the
average" for all large issues if they concentrated on offerings in
the 1 percent and over class, while purchasers of small issues beat
the corresponding average for all small issues only if they concen-
trated on offerings in the 2 percent and over class. Although real-
ized yields on all small issues averaged above those on all large
issues, the relationship is reversed within market-rating classes.
The explanation appears to be that the market rated down a
larger proportion of small issues at offering than of large issues,
in effect pushing the higher-yielding low grades into the next
poorer market-rating class.
The most striking feature of Table 66 is that negative loss rates
(capital gains) occurred regularly on total offerings of large issues
in all the different market-rating classes, and that the size of the
capital gain was virtually independent of the rating assigned at
offering. The same was true of the large regular offerings, except
those with market ratings of 2 percent and over, where capital
losses occurred. The virtual independence of the market rating
and the loss rate runs counter to the classical theory of investment
values. According to that theory, the market rating is a forecast
of the loss rate (cf. page 323), and the two should average out at
about the same level for securities properly priced in the market.
Market forecasts of the loss rates appear to have been somewhat
more reliable for small issues than for large, but for small regular
offerings since 1920 the average loss rate was negative for half the
total volume (issues with market ratings of under 1percent).
Moreover, throughout the table the average loss rates were con-
sistently below the mid-points of the corresponding market-ratingINVESTOR EXPERIENCE 337
TABLE 66—Life-spanYields and LossRatesforBonds




RatingUnder1/2 1/2_i 1—2 2Percent
Classes PercentPercent Percentand over
Promised Yield
Total Offerings
Largeissues 5.3% 3.8% 4.5% 5.4% 9.3%
Small issues 6.3 3.9 4,6 5.7 8.1
Regular Offerings
Large issues 4.9 3.8 4.3 5.4 7.1
Smallissues 5.8 3.9 4.6 5.7 6.9
Regular Offerings
since 1920
Largeissues 4.9 3.8 4.5 5.5 7.5
Small issues 6.3 4.4 4.9 6.0 7.0
Realized Yield
Total Offerings
Largeissues 5.4 3.9 4.7 5.5 9.3
Smallissues 6.1 3.9 4.6 5.1 8.3
Regular Offerings
Largeissues 5.0 3.9 4.7 5.3 6.8
Small issues 5.3 3.9 4.6 5.1 6.2
Regular Offerings
since 1920
Largeissues 5.2 4.0 5.0 5.8 7.1
Small issues 5.6 4.7 5,3 5.1 6.2
Loss Rate
Total Offerings
Largeissues —0.1 —0.1 —0.2 —0.1 —0.2
Small issues 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 —0.2
Regular Offerings
Largeissues —0.1 —0.1 —0.2 —0.1 0.3
Smallissues 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7
Regular Offerings
since 1920
Large issues —0.3 —0.2 —0.5 —0.3 0.4
Small issues 0.7 —0.3 —0.4 0.9 0.8
Based on Tables 190 and 191 of Statistical Measures, covering issues in the
offerings experience sample. Yields and loss rates are weighted averages
with par amounts of included offerings as weights. For issues still outstanding
on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at prices prevailing in the first
quarter of that year.338 M4RKET RATING
classes. It thus appears that on the average risk premiums were
larger than needed at offering, and that the excess was greater at
the poorer end of the quality scale.
One more point should be noted before leaving Table 66. A
close correlation is to be observed between the yields promised at
offering and the life-span yields realized on issues classified by
market rating at offering. This means that, on the average, for
issues so classified the promised yield could have been used to pre-
dict the realized yield over the full period studied. On the other
hand, the absence of a close relationship between the two yields
for issues offered and extinguished in different minor periods (and
for offerings of different minor industry groups; cf. Chapter 2)
serves as a warning that the promised yield was a reliable indicator
of the realized yield only in a broad average sense, and for issues
classified by market rating at offering. Moreover, the close rela-
tionship between the promised and realized yields for issues classi-
fied by market rating at offering does not mean that the market
was able to distinguish accurately between the prospective rates
of return on issues of different grades. Quite the contrary is true.
For if the risk premium as measured by market rating had been
accurately determined at offering, the loss rates would have been
roughly equivalent to the risk premiums; the realized yields would
have been independent of the market ratings; and the promised
yields would have been related to the realized yields only through
the effect of the basic yields on each (and the two would have
been independent of one another when classified by market rat-
ing, except for the possible influence of the level of basic yields on
yield spreads at offering). The promised yields at offering proved
to be good indicators of the life-span realized yields largely be-
cause the market failed to predict the returns actually obtained on
issues in different quality classes, overvaluing high grades and
undervaluing low grades.
Average Yields and Loss Rates
over Chronological Periods
In most important respects, the experience record of issues held
over assumed chronological periods of investment (Table 67)
confirms that of issues purchased at offering and held to extin-
guishment. As would be expected, the weighted average promised
yields to maturity rise consistently throughout the table with the
size of the yield spread at the beginning of the periods. For theINVESTOR EXPERIENCE 339
longer chronological periods the realized yields also rise fairly
regularly for successively poorer market-rating grades, the ex-
ceptions being 1920—39, 1928—39, and 1932—39. In two of those
periods the realized yields of issues with market ratings under ½
percentaveraged only slightly higher than yields of issues in the
½to1 percent class, and in the third period the yields were
slightly higher in the 1 to 2 percent class than in the 2 percent
and over class. Because of the greater influence of market prices
on the yields realized over quadrennial periods, these yields be-
haved more erratically than the yields for the longer periods. Yet
the quadrennial yields, too, increase for successively poorer mar-
ket-rating grades when averaged over the eleven four-year periods.
(The averages of the quadrennial realized yields for the four
market-rating classes given in the table, reading from left to right,
are 3.7 percent, 4.0 percent, 4.6 percent, and 6.7 percent). Marked
departures from the typical pattern occurred only in periods of
market deterioration (see Chapter 2). Such were the periods
1912—15, 1928—31, and 1936—39 (cf. Table 8); in each, the high
grades fared better than the low grades. Except for minor irregu-
larities in 1916—19 and in 1940—43, the other returns were in in-
verse order of quality; that is, the realized yields were higher the
larger the yield spread assigned by the market at the beginning
of the respective periods.
The fluctuations of the quadrennial realized yields indicate that
the superiority of high-grade issues stems partly from the fact that
their prices and yields are more stable. Thus, reading from left
to right in the table for the four market-rating classes, the average
deviations of the quadrennial realized yields about the grand
means calculated over the eleven periods are 2.3 percent, 2.6 per-
cent, 3.1 percent, and 5.2 percent. Clearly, short-run trading losses
(and profits) were larger on the low grades than on the high
grades. On the average, however, higher returns were obtained on
the low-grade investments.
Essentially the same point is brought Out by the loss rates of
Table 67. It will be recalled that the loss rate is zero only for an
issue selling at its amortized book value at the end of an invest-
ment period, where the book value is based on the price ruling
at the beginning of the period. Usually, the absolute values of the
loss rates were larger for the low-grade issues, indicating that the
high grades had the most stable market values. To put the matter
differently, the average deviations of the quadrennial loss rates34•0 MARKET RATING
TABLE 67—Yields and Loss Rates over Four-year and Longer
Periods of Investment on Bonds with High and Low





Large Under 1,4..1 1—2 2Percent
PERIOD Issues PercentPercentPercentand over
Promised Yield
1900—1903 4.2% 3.5% 4.0% 4.6% 5.9%
1904—1907 4.6 3.9 4.4 5.0 7.0
1908—1911 5.1 4.1 4.6 5.4 7.5
1912—1915 4.7 4.1 4.6 5.3 6.8
1916—1919 5.0 4.3 4.8 5.5 7.5
1920—1923 6.9 5.3 5.9 6.6 9.1
1924—1927 6.0 4.9 .5.4 6.1 8.2
1928—1931 5.0 4.3 4.7 5.4 6.9
1932—1935 8.9 5.0 5.4 6.0 12.2
1936—1939 4.9 3.1 3.8 4,4 6.6
1940—1943 5.6 2.8 3.2 3.9 8.3
1900—1907 4.2 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.9
1900—1919 4.2 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.8
1908—1915 5.1 4.1 4.6 5.4 7.5
1920—1927 6.7 5.3 5.9 6.5 8.6
1920—1931 6.6 5.2 5.8 6.5 8.6
1920—1939 6.5 5.2 5.8 6.5 8.6
1924—1939 5.8 4.9 5.3 6.1 7.8
1928—1939 4.9 4.3 4.7 5.4 6.7
1932—1939 8.2 5.0 5.4 6.0 11.1
RealizedYield
1900—1903 4.1 2.3 3.8 5.0 7.4
1904—1907 3.7 2.6 3.1 4.3 7.9
1908—1911 6.5 4.3 5.4 7.5 11.2
1912—1915 2.7 3.1 3.0 2.1 0.9
1916—1919 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.3
1920—1923 8.8 6.8 8.0 8.8 10.9
1924—1927 8.5 7.1 7.6 8.8 11.3
1928—1931 —0.9 —0.1 0.2 —1.5 —5.4
1932—1935 11.7 9.0 9.3 10.1 13.7
1936—1939 1.3 2.3 0.6 1.4 1.2
1940—1943 7.8 2.8 2.5 4.3 13.3
1900—1907 3.6 2.3 3.4 4.2 5.9
1900—1919 3.3 2.5 3.1 3.9 4.7
1908—1915 4.8 3.6 4.4 5.6 6.8
1920—1927 8.7 6.9 7.8 8.5 11.1
1920—1931 6.1 5.5 5.5 6.3 6.9
1920—1939 5.9 5.4 5.3 6.,2 6.9
1924—1939 5.1 4.5 4.9 5.5 6.1
1928—1939 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.4




All . — .
Large Under 1/2 1/2.1 1—2 2 Percent




1904—1907 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.7 —0.9
1908—1911 —1.4 —0.2 —0.8 —2.1 —3.7
1912—1915 2.0 1.0 1.6 3.2 5.9
1916—1919 4.8 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.2
1920—1923 —1,9 —1.5 —2.1 —2.2 —1.8
1924—1927 —2.5 —2.2 —2.2 —2.7 —3.1
1928—1931 5.9 4.4 4.5 6.9 12.3
1932—1935 —2.8 —4.0 —3.9 —4.1 —1.5
1936—1939 3,6 0.8 3.2 3.0 5.4
1940—1943 —2.2 0.0 0.7 —0.4 —5.0
1900—1907 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.0
1900—1919 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.1
1908—1915 0.3 0.5 0.2 —0.2 0.7
1920—1927 —2.0 —1.6 —1.9 —2.0 —2.5
1920—1931 0.5 —0.3 0.3 0.2 1.7
1920—1939 0.6 —0.2 0.5 0.3 1.7
1924—1939 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.7
1928—1939 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 3.3
1932—1939 0.9 —1.5 —0.9 —0.6 3.0
From Table 173 of Statistical Measures, covering large issues in the periodic
experience sample. Yields and loss rates are weighted averages with par
amounts of outstandings at the beginning of the relevant period as weights.
(computed about zero) for the eleven periods are 1.9 percent, 2.3
percent, 2.8 percent, and 4.3 percent, respectively, for the four
market-rating classes of the table. The implication isthat a
short-run trading position in corporate bonds is more precarious,
the lower the quality of the holding, but, since the average yields
realized are usually higher for the poorer issues, the odds are
biased, so to speak, in favor of the more speculative positions.
This, of course, is simply another way of saying that the promised
yields of the low-grade issues contain a premium for risk bearing
over and above the normal risk premium; and that the premium
for risk bearing may reflect in part the price instability of the low-
grade issues.